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Abstract
We investigate experimentally the impact of religious observance on prosocial behavior. Our
sample consists of male factory workers in a manufacturing facility in Iran. In our between-
subjects’ design, each worker is asked to allocate an amount of money between himself and a
stranger. Specifically, we examine behavior before and after the daily break of the Ramadan
fast. We also examine behavior outside of Ramadan, where we treat alimentary abstention as
akin to a long fasting period. We hypothesize and confirm that outside Ramadan, decision
makers who abstain from any alimentary intake transfer less money to recipients relative to
decision makers who do not abstain. Strikingly, this effect is reversed during the month of
Ramadan. Specifically, workers who are in the midst of their Ramadan fast are far more gener-
ous to recipients than workers who have had their evening meal. Interestingly, workers during
Ramadan and workers outside Ramadan that consumed aliments make statistically similar
transfers. Our findings suggest that it is the interaction between alimentary abstention and
religious observance that amplifies prosocial behavior.
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1 Introduction
Does alimentary (henceforth, aliments refer to food and fluids) intake amplify prosocial be-
havior? Recent physiological research indicates that self-control, which is necessary for
prosocial acts, requires glucose intake (see Gailliot, Baumeister, DeWall, Maner, Plant,
Tice, Brewer, and Schmeichel (2007), Gailliot and Baumeister (2007), and Gailliot (2015)).
Glucose-depleted individuals may profess greater support for social welfare, but when incen-
tivized they do not seem to behave in a prosocial manner. Specifically, when these individuals
are asked to redistribute an endowment between themselves and a recipient, higher blood
glucose levels are shown to lead to greater giving (Aarøe and Petersen (2013)). Perhaps,
the most striking field evidence of the association between alimentary intake and prosocial
behavior is from a study on decisions by Israeli judges (Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso
(2011)). In the study, Israeli judges are shown more likely to grant a parole or a parolee’s
request after a meal break when controlling for the characteristics of the cases examined.
Given the evidence that alimentary intake is associated with higher prosocial giving, it
might seem strange that major religious festivities integrate fasting with giving. However,
religiosity is a social multifaceted phenomenon that prescribes rules of behavior of varying
degree of strictness and intensity. These aspects of religiosity trigger different effects on
socioeconomic outcomes (see Barro and McCleary (2003), McCleary and Barro (2006), and
Carpantier and Litina (2014)), which complicate both conceptually and empirically the task
of assessing and identifying their impact on economic decisions.1
In this study, we propose a controlled between-subjects’ experiment to investigate the
impact of the religious observance of Ramadan on prosocial behavior. The observance of
Ramadan is understood to be obligatory for all Muslim believers and dictates a well-defined
rule of behavior, whereby followers abstain from any consumption of aliments from dawn to
sunset. Naturally, Ramadan fasting entails physiological consequences. Medical literature
has consistently found body weight loss, significant metabolic changes and symptoms, such
as irritability, headaches, sleep deprivation and lassitude (see, for example, Ziaee, Razaei,
Ahmadinejad, Shaikh, Yousefi, Yarmohammadi, Bozorgi, and Behjati (2006)). Furthermore,
studies have documented significant prevalence of individuals reporting tiredness and un-
willingness to work as well as reduced levels of activity and concentration ability (see, for
instance, Karaag˘aog˘lu and Yu¨cecan (2000)). To date, however, very few economic studies
1Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) identify three ways in which religious practices constrain be-
lievers and thereby affect economic outcomes. First, they require a tradeoff between time and resources that
are then unavailable for production. Second, they can affect directly productivity either by limiting social
interactions with non-believers or by imposing dietary restrictions. Third, they may shape beliefs and values
that affect economic decisions.
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have been conducted in Islamic countries in the context of religious observances, such as the
month of Ramadan.2
Our unique sample consists of male workers in a manufacturing factory in Iran. We
employ a standard Dictator decision task (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994))
to assess prosocial behavior as is often done in the literature (see, for example, Aarøe and
Petersen (2013)). Specifically, the decision maker (the ‘dictator’) is provided with a mone-
tary endowment. He is then asked to allocate the endowment between himself and a passive
(outside) recipient with the understanding that the allocation will be implemented immedi-
ately.3 Within the Ramadan sample, we examine behavior before and after the daily break
of the fast, which allows us to associate fasting and prosocial behavior. We also examine the
behavior of the factory workers outside Ramadan, where we do not have the daily break of
the fast as the natural time separation. Instead, we treat alimentary abstention as akin to a
long fasting period.
In line with existing literature, we confirm that, outside Ramadan, decision makers who
abstained from any alimentary intake transfer less money to recipients relative to decision
makers who did not abstain. Furthermore, we test the hypothesis that, in the midst of the
Ramadan fast, abstention from any consumption of food and fluids along with the spirit of
the religious observance of Ramadan will make religious principles more salient, and workers
will be far more generous to recipients than workers who have had their evening meal.
Indeed, workers, in the midst of their fast, give significantly more to recipients. Interestingly,
workers, during Ramadan, who have had their evening meal, and workers, outside Ramadan,
who did not abstain from any food and fluids intake, make statistically similar transfers.
These findings suggest that it is the interaction between alimentary abstention and religious
observance that amplifies prosocial behavior.
The layout of this paper adheres to the following plan. In Section 2, we describe the
experimental design, and in Section 3, we formulate our general hypotheses. In Section 4,
we report the important findings, and in Section 5, we offer concluding remarks.
2Some notable exceptions are the studies of Clingingsmith, Khwaja, and Kremer (2009) and Campante
and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015).
3This setup has been used extensively in the literature to test the basic economic premise of individuals
behaving in their own self-interest. Experimental results, contrary to this premise, have indicated that
only a minority of dictators keep the entire endowment to themselves (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton
(1994)). Researchers (see, for instance, Andreoni and Miller (2002)) have attributed this behavior to prosocial
preferences.
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2 Experimental Methodology
The experiments were run in a manufacturing facility in Iran. In Figure 1, we display the age
and monthly wage distribution of the factory’s labor force at the time of the experiments.
At that time, the factory had 881 workers where almost 90% were men. Workers work in the
factory in 12-hour shifts. There are two types of shifts: the day shift that starts at 6:30am
and the night shift that starts at 6:30pm. Typically, two meals are served in the factory:
a lunch in the day shift, which takes place around 1:30pm, and a dinner in the night shift,
which takes place around 8:30pm. In addition, a snack in lieu of a breakfast is served to the
day-shift workers around 10:00am. Finally, from 10:00am until 6:00pm a canteen operates
that sells various nourishments. During the month of Ramadan, no snack or lunch is served
and the dinner takes place a few minutes after the sunset. Furthermore, people not observing
the Ramadan fast must use the cafeteria space to eat and drink in order not to provoke the
individuals that observe the fast. The canteen is throughout the month of Ramadan closed.
Figure 1: Age & Monthly Wage Distribution of the Factory’s Labor Force
Notes: This information was provided by the management of the factory. Note that 1,000,000 Rials is
around $31.50.
Our objective in this study is to examine the impact of the religious observance of Ra-
madan on prosocial behavior. In the experimental design, we focused on two dimensions.
The first dimension is whether the decision maker abstained from any intake of aliments.
The second dimension is whether the calendar date of the experiment coincided with the
month of Ramadan. We thus examined behavior before and after the daily break of the
Ramadan fast as well as outside of Ramadan, where we treated alimentary abstention as
akin to a long fasting period.
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All sessions took place in the cafeteria at the factory premises. On the days of the
experiments, both the cafeteria and the canteen were kept closed to enable the experimenters
to arrange the space appropriately (a photo of the modified area is included in the Appendix).
Our between-subjects’ experimental design consisted of three sessions. Two sessions (one
night session and one day session) took place during the month of Ramadan, which started
on June 28th of 2014 and ended on July 27th of 2014. Specifically, the night session was
conducted on July 14th, 2014 at 10:30pm with night-shift workers, and the day session was
conducted on July 16th, 2014 at 1:00pm with day-shift workers. One more day session with
day-shift workers was conducted outside of Ramadan on March 5th, 2015 at 1:30pm.4 All
experimental sessions were paper-and-pencil. Employees were allowed to participate in only
one session. Any concerns for spillover effects across sessions were mitigated by the calendar
distance between the two day sessions, and by the management’s reassurance that day-shift
workers and night-shift workers very rarely overlap or interact at the factory premises. The
characteristics of the experimental sessions are shown in Table 1. The age and monthly wage
distribution of the participants by group (the group classification is provided in Subsection
4.1) is provided in the Appendix.
Table 1: Characteristics of the Experimental Sessions
# of # of Took place # who
Date Time participants Ramadan during abstained from
observants Ramadan? aliments
July 14, 2014 10:30pm 80 47 Yes 0
July 16, 2014 1:00pm 77 52 Yes 52
March 5, 2015 1:30pm 75 75 No 28
Notes: In the first two columns, we provide information on the calendar date and time of the sessions. In
the third column, we provide the total number of participants. The fourth column indicates the number of
participants who observed the Ramadan fast as self-reported in the questionnaire. The fifth column indicates
whether the session took place during the month of Ramadan or not. The last column indicates the number
of participants who abstained from any consumption of aliments in the last seven hours as self-reported in
the questionnaire.
Initially, participants were offered 50,000 Rials (around $1.60) for their participation
in the experiment. This amount was paid to them at the very end of the experiment.
Participants were instructed that the session consisted of two parts to be described at the
4This date was placed in-between the religious festivity of Eid Milad un Nabi that was celebrated on
January 8th, 2015 and the religious festivity of Lailat al Miraj that was celebrated on May 13th, 2015.
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appropriate time. In the first part, they were presented with a single shot, Dictator task
and were all in the role of dictator.5 Specifically, dictators were given an envelope, which
contained 10 notes of 10,000 Rials each, for a total of 100,000 Rials (this is equivalent to
two hours of minimum wage in Iran). They were then asked to decide how many Rials
out of the 100,000 Rials they would like to keep, while noting that the remaining amount
would be transferred to a person outside of the factory.6 All dictators were informed that
the outside recipient would not be given any identifying information about them and that
all information was completely anonymous. The recipients of the money were women who
are under the supervision of the Seddigin Charity Foundation. The foundation is dedicated
to feeding hungry women. Neither the recipients’ gender nor the name of the foundation
was disclosed to the decision makers. Dictators had to place the amount to be transferred
inside the envelope. The amount that was not transferred was theirs to keep. The envelopes
were collected at the end of the session and the amount in the envelopes was recorded. In
the second part, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire. Two questions asked
participants to report on their religion (all participants self-reported to be Muslims), and
on whether they observed the Ramadan fast.7 Further questions were posed to determine
whether participants had consumed any food or fluids at all in the last seven hours, and for
those who did consume, what they had consumed and how many hours had elapsed since
their very last consumption. These questions were placed to enable the experimenters to
classify abstaining and non-abstaining participants appropriately. For instance, a participant
who consumed food in the last seven hours, but had no nourishments whatsoever in the last
3 hours could potentially have depleted his glucose levels. In contrast, a participant who
consumed food within the hour, would still have rich levels of glucose. To avoid confusion, our
terminology as to how we interpret abstention and how we define non-abstention is presented
next. Henceforth, we define those who abstained from any consumption of aliments as those
5In a series of recent publications in economics, caution was urged in drawing inferences on the Dictator
games when mapping laboratory evidence to the field (List (2007), Bardsley (2008), Zizzo (2010), Zizzo and
Fleming (2011), and Zizzo (2013)). The aforementioned studies posit that dictators’ behavior could instead
be driven by experimenter demand effects. Moreover, the presence of experimenter demand effects could
be amplified as a result of different cues (Burnham (2003), Haley and Fessler (2005), Bran˜as-Garza (2006),
Bran˜as-Garza (2007), and Koch and Normann (2008)). While experimenter demand effects may have an
impact on subjects’ decisions, any such effects should be constant across sessions; consequently, they merit
no real concern to the interpretation of our results.
6We felt compelled to impose these (non-standard) assumptions to eliminate possible confounding effects
that could arise due to expectations of generalized reciprocity (Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000)).
7Socially, there is no taboo in admitting lapses in fasting, for medical, travel or other reasons during
Ramadan. Hence, we had no difficulty in getting a large minority portion of the sample admitting to
not fasting during Ramadan without fear or stigma. This was not the case with participants outside of
Ramadan. Placing the question more broadly did not sit well with respondents; hence, all participants
reported observing the Ramadan fast.
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who did not have anything to eat or drink (not even a sip of water) for at least seven hours,
and we define those who did not abstain from any consumption of aliments as those who had
something to eat or drink (even a sip of water) in the last two hours.8 Thus, participants
who had something to eat or drink in the last seven hours, but did not have anything to
eat or drink for more than two hours were taken out from the sample. The experimental
instructions are provided in the Appendix.
To ensure that samples were randomly drawn and that the same experimental conditions
were maintained across sessions we had to make the following design choices. As stated ear-
lier, the night session during Ramadan took place at 10:30pm. At that time very few women
work at the factory. We were thus compelled to eliminate women from the experimental
sessions altogether to safeguard against a sampling bias. Though we precluded female par-
ticipants, the recruitment of male participants was otherwise done randomly. Furthermore,
to maintain comparability across sessions, we had to ensure the same number of hours of
alimentary abstention during the day experiments. We were thus led to conduct the day
experiments at different times. During Ramadan, the experiment took place at 1:00pm,
whereas outside Ramadan the experiment took place at 1:30pm. On July 16th, 2014 the
sunrise took place at 6:00am. Given that the experiment took place at 1:00pm, it is safe to
assume that (Ramadan-observant) participants had been fasting for at least seven hours. To
have meaningful comparison to the Ramadan day session, we therefore had to conduct the
experiment of March 5th, 2015 at 1:30pm right before lunch in order to ensure an alimentary
abstention of, also, at least seven hours (recall the day shift starts at 6:30am). To secure a
large number of participants abstaining from any intake of aliments, on that day, we forewent
serving the snack at 10:00am and kept the canteen closed for the entire day. Additionally,
by announcing and keeping the canteen closed for the entire day, we ensured that money
had no immediate value in any of the sessions (recall that during Ramadan the canteen is
kept closed). Nevertheless, some workers still consumed (home-made) aliments.9 Workers
who had consumed aliments within the last two hours on that day were compared to the
night-shift workers of the Ramadan session that took place at 10:30pm. The sunset on July
14th, 2014 was at 8:21pm. The night shift workers had their dinner right after the sunset.
This ensures a two-hour window to consume aliments during Ramadan, which is comparable
to the window allowed outside of Ramadan.
8In other words, participants who said ‘Yes’ to Q5 in the questionnaire and either said ‘Less than one
hour’ or ‘Between 1 and 2 hours’ since their last consumption in Q7 were labelled as ‘did not abstain’ from
any alimentary intake.
9In the questionnaire, these workers self-reported to have eaten in the last seven hours food items, such
as one or two slices of toast, oranges, biscuits, bread and cheese, and to have drunk mostly tea and water.
6
3 General Hypotheses
We formulate three general hypotheses. The first hypothesis examines the differences in
transfer, outside of Ramadan, when manipulating dictators’ alimentary abstention. Specif-
ically, we hypothesize that, outside Ramadan, abstaining dictators will transfer less money
to recipients relative to dictators who do not abstain. Existing psysiological literature estab-
lishes that individuals with higher blood glucose levels are more giving than individuals with
depleted glucose levels (Aarøe and Petersen (2013)). Along the same lines, Harel and Kogut
(2015) indicate that people tend to be more generous when satisfied than when actively
experiencing a visceral need, such as hunger.
Hypothesis 1 Outside Ramadan, abstaining dictators transfer less money to recipients
relative to dictators who do not abstain.
The second hypothesis aims to investigate the effect on dictators’ transfers, during Ra-
madan, of the interaction between alimentary abstention and the religious observance of
Ramadan. During Ramadan, we hypothesize that the combination of the two will make
religious principles more salient, and thus fasting dictators will increase significantly their
transfers relative to dictators who have had their evening meal. Indeed, existing experimen-
tal literature finds evidence that priming religion causes subjects to identify more with their
religion and affects their decisions. Lambarraa and Riener (2012), for instance, manipulate
the saliency of Islamic values in their field experiments in Morocco to investigate the effect
on charitable giving. The authors use the Arabic language (in lieu of the French language)
to prime participants’ religiosity, and find that donations increase significantly.
Hypothesis 2 In Ramadan, fasting dictators transfer more money to recipients relative
to dictators who have had their evening meal.
The third hypothesis serves as a direct test of the impact of the religious observance of
Ramadan on dictators’ transfers. We conjecture that the observance of Ramadan is salient
enough to cause dictators who have had their evening meal to transfer more to recipients
relative to dictators, outside of Ramadan, who do not abstain.
Hypothesis 3 Dictators who have had their evening meal in Ramadan transfer more
money to recipients relative to dictators, outside of Ramadan, who do not abstain.
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4 Results
The three hypotheses are formally tested next. Each hypothesis is matched with the corre-
sponding result; that is, result i is a report on the test of hypothesis i.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
We first report descriptive statistics on the raw experimental data. Based on the calendar
date and time and the participants’ responses in the questionnaire, participants were classi-
fied into six groups: four Ramadan groups and two outside-of-Ramadan groups. The four
groups during Ramadan are: (i) observant, post-dinner, (ii) non-observant, post-dinner, (iii)
observant, mid-fast, and (iv) non-observant, mid-fast. The two groups outside of Ramadan
are: (v) abstained from any aliments, and (vi) did not abstain from any aliments. In Table
2, we report the frequency and percentage for each monetary transfer of the decision makers
by group. To simplify the exposition, the transfers are displayed in terms of the number of
notes out of a total of 10 notes. The histograms are displayed in Figure 2. Note that the
mean payoff can be calculated by subtracting the mean transfer from the endowment and
adding the show-up fee.
By the strictest economic principle of self-serving economic agents, an individual should
transfer nothing to an anonymous recipient. That principle we can reject outright. Even
in our most extreme group, the abstaining dictators outside of Ramadan, the mean is 3.07
notes. Next, relaxing the self-serving principle, outside Ramadan, abstaining dictators are
predicted to transfer fewer notes to recipients than non-abstaining dictators. Indeed, those
who abstained from any aliments transferred on average 1.42 fewer notes to recipients than
the dictators who did not abstain. During Ramadan, for the observant participants, the trend
is reversed: dictators in the mid-fast session gave on average 1.71 more notes to recipients
than dictators in the post-dinner session. Furthermore, the impact of the meal after the fast
seems to be large enough to offset the increased prosocial behavior generated by the fast.
Specifically, the average transfer of 4.64 notes post-dinner is statistically indistinguishable
from the average transfer of 4.49 notes by those who did not abstain from any intake of
aliments outside of Ramadan.
4.2 Analysis
We perform next statistical analysis to investigate the effect of the treated variables on the
dictators’ transfers. First, we conduct a number of regressions on transfer. The first three
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A
In Ramadan
Observant Non-Observant
Mid-Fast Post-Dinner Mid-Fast Post-Dinner
Transfer Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 3 5.77 5 10.64 3 12.00 0 0.00
1 1 1.92 0 0.00 1 4.00 1 3.03
2 4 7.69 7 14.89 8 32.00 11 33.33
3 4 7.69 4 8.51 1 4.00 7 21.21
4 4 7.69 3 6.38 0 0.00 0 0.00
5 11 21.15 20 42.55 7 28.00 11 33.33
6 2 3.85 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
7 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
8 2 3.85 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
9 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 3.03
10 21 40.38 8 17.02 5 20.00 2 6.06
Obs. 52 47 25 33
Mean 6.35 4.64 4.20 3.88
St. Dev. 3.42 2.95 3.39 2.29
Panel B
Outside of Ramadan
Abstained Did Not Abstain
Transfer Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 4 14.29 7 14.89
1 4 14.29 1 2.13
2 6 21.43 6 12.77
3 2 7.14 3 6.38
4 1 3.57 1 2.13
5 10 35.71 18 38.30
6 0 0.00 3 6.38
7 0 0.00 1 2.13
8 0 0.00 0 0.00
9 0 0.00 0 0.00
10 1 3.57 7 14.89
Obs. 28 47
Mean 3.07 4.49
St. Dev. 2.34 3.05
Notes: In the two panels, we report the frequency and percentage for each monetary transfer of the decision
makers by group.
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Figure 2: Transfers by Group
Ramadan,	Observant,	Post-Dinner Ramadan,	Non-Observant,	Post-Dinner
Ramadan,	Observant,	Mid-Fast Ramadan,	Non-Observant,	Mid-Fast
Outside	of	Ramadan,	Abstained Outside	of	Ramadan,	Did	Not	Abstain
models are Tobit regressions where observations are left censored at 0 and right censored
at 10. The fourth model is an OLS regression. As our base in the regressions, we take
the transfer of the non-abstaining dictators outside of Ramadan. The estimates of the four
models are displayed in Table 3. Second, we present the p-values of the pairwise compar-
isons of the distribution of transfers using the Kruskall-Wallis Rank test (see the analysis of
Feltovich (2003) for the appropriateness of the latter test), where the H0 states that there
are no differences across the selected groups. The results of the Kruskall-Wallis Rank test
with ties are displayed in Table 4. In Panel A of Table 4, we report the comparisons in the
transfers between abstaining and non-abstaining dictators outside of Ramadan, mid-fast and
post-dinner dictators who are observant in Ramadan, and mid-fast and post-dinner dictators
10
who are non-observant in Ramadan. In Panel B of Table 4, we investigate the differences in
transfer across non-abstaining dictators outside of Ramadan, post-dinner dictators who are
observant in Ramadan, and post-dinner dictators who are non-observant in Ramadan.10
Table 3: Regressions on Transfer
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Intercept 5.12*** 4.46*** 4.46*** 1.40
(0.30) (0.62) (0.60) (1.43)
Abstained -2.34*** -1.68* -1.67* -1.24*
(0.85) (1.01) (0.97) (0.71)
Ramadan 0.85 -0.15 -0.04
(0.71) (1.01) (0.74)
Mid-Fast × Observant × Ramadan 2.89*** 2.07***
(1.01) (0.72)
Post-Dinner × Ramadan -0.33 -0.51
(1.07) (0.79)
Post-Dinner × Observant × Ramadan 0.76 0.79
(0.91) (0.67)
Age 0.09**
(0.04)
Observations 232
Notes: A dictator’s transfer is the dependent variable. The first three models are Tobit regressions. 22
observations were left censored at 0 and 44 observations were right censored at 10. The fourth model is an
OLS regression. As a base, we used non-abstaining dictators outside of Ramadan. ‘Abstained’ is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the dictator outside Ramadan abstained from any intake of aliments and
0 otherwise, ‘Ramadan’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the dictator is in Ramadan and 0
otherwise, ‘Mid-Fast × Observant × Ramadan’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the dictator
is an observant who is in the midst of his fast in Ramadan and 0 otherwise, ‘Post-Dinner × Ramadan’ is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the dictator had his evening meal in Ramadan and 0 otherwise,
and ‘Post-Dinner × Observant × Ramadan’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the dictator
is an observant who had his evening meal in Ramadan and 0 otherwise. The variable ‘Age’ corresponds to
the age of the dictator. All standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level **
Significant at the 5% level *** Significant at the 1% level.
The first hypothesis examines the differences in transfer, outside of Ramadan, when
manipulating dictators’ alimentary abstention. The coefficient of the variable ‘Abstained’ in
Table 3 is negative and significant in all regressions. Therefore, we can confirm that, outside
Ramadan, decision makers who abstained from any consumption of aliments transfer less
10The median tests performed on the equality of the medians confirm the stated results.
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Table 4: Kruskall-Wallis Rank Tests on Transfer
Panel A
Alternative hypothesis: transferi 6= transferj
p-values
Outside of Ramadan
Abstained vs. Did Not Abstain 0.04
In Ramadan
Observant
Mid-Fast vs. Post-Dinner 0.02
Non-Observant
Mid-Fast vs. Post-Dinner 0.83
Panel B
Alternative hypothesis: transferi 6= transferj
p-values
Outside of Ramadan, Did Not Abstain vs.
In Ramadan, Non-Observant, Post-Dinner 0.25
Outside of Ramadan, Did Not Abstain vs.
In Ramadan, Observant, Post-Dinner 0.95
In Ramadan, Observant, Post-Dinner vs.
In Ramadan, Non-Observant, Post-Dinner 0.17
Notes: We utilize the Kruskall-Wallis Rank tests (with ties) to determine any differences (i 6= j) in the
transfer across the selected groups. In Panel A, we report the p-values of the comparison in the transfers
between abstaining and non-abstaining participants outside of Ramadan, mid-fast and post-dinner dictators
who are observant in Ramadan, and mid-fast and post-dinner dictators who are non-observant in Ramadan.
In Panel B, we report the p-values of the comparison in the transfers across non-abstaining dictators outside
of Ramadan, post-dinner dictators who are observant in Ramadan, and post-dinner dictators who are non-
observant in Ramadan.
money to recipients relative to decision makers who did not abstain. This is also reflected
in Panel A of Table 4 where the H0 is rejected at the 5% level. In line with the findings of
Harel and Kogut (2015), our first main result is formalized as follows.
Result 1 Outside Ramadan, abstaining dictators transfer significantly less money to
recipients relative to non-abstaining dictators.
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The second hypothesis aims to investigate the effect on dictators’ transfers, during Ra-
madan, of the interaction between alimentary abstention and the religious observance of
Ramadan. The estimates of the variable ‘Mid-Fast × Observant × Ramadan’ in Table 3 are
positive, significant and large enough to reverse the trend observed outside of Ramadan. The
comparison with non-observant participants at Panel A of Table 4 rules out a time-of-the-day
effect (afternoon vs. night-time). These findings culminate in our second main result.
Result 2 In Ramadan, post-dinner, observant dictators transfer significantly less money
to recipients relative to fasting and observant dictators. The difference in behavior between
non-observant, mid-fast dictators and non-observant, post-dinner dictators is not significant.
The third hypothesis tests the direct impact of the religious observance of Ramadan
on dictators’ transfers. Table 3 indicates, contrary to our conjecture in Section 3, that
Ramadan by itself, without the interaction with alimentary abstention, has no significant
effect on transfer despite the fact that all respondents identified themselves as practicing
Muslims and an important tenet of Ramadan is giving. A close look at Panel B in Table
4 reveals that the amount given by those who did not abstain outside of Ramadan is not
significantly different from the amount given by either observant or non-observant dictators
in Ramadan. This suggests that it takes one meal to bring prosocial behavior back to
‘normal’ (non-Ramadan) levels. It is important to note that, in Ramadan, the amount given
by observant and non-observant dictators who had their evening meal is not statistically
different. Therefore, the religious observance of Ramadan in itself does not seem to be
strong enough to guide more generous transfers in the absence of consumption of aliments.
Result 3 Dictators during Ramadan who had their evening meal and dictators outside of
Ramadan who did not abstain from any consumption of aliments transfer the same amount
of money to recipients.
A final result gleaned from Table 3 is that transfers increase with age, which corroborates
earlier findings of Hinde and Groebel (1991). In fact, in a recent study, List (2011) collected
data from the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) and found that not only chari-
table giving increases with age, but also that giving as a percentage of the household income
increases with age. In conjunction with another finding, whereby giving to various causes is
largely unaffected by the state of the economy, the author conjectures that a plausible reason
for the increase in giving could be social insurance and/or ensuring a peaceful afterlife (p.
165).
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5 Concluding Remarks
We presented evidence that alimentary abstention is related to lower prosocial behavior
outside of a religious observance in accordance with the existing literature. However, during
the religious month of Ramadan, those who fast exhibit more prosocial behavior than those
who have had their evening meal. Importantly, once they break the daily fast, they appear
to revert back to their ‘normal’ levels of prosocial behavior. Therefore, religious fasting does
not appear to have long lasting effects, but the short-term effect is substantial, remarkable,
and in the exact opposite direction to the effect of abstention and prosocial behavior outside
of Ramadan. We also find an increase in transfers with age, which is in line with existing
literature (see Hinde and Groebel (1991) and List (2011)).
Fasting is most central in Islam where it is considered an obligation for all believers and
the foundation of Muslim life. Consequently, the month of Ramadan was the natural setting
to test the basic impact of alimentary abstention on prosocial behavior. Moreover, Ramadan
fasting is the longest period of abstention of any major religion and affects a large portion
of the world population with likely a substantial economic impact on the world economy.
Indeed, Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) find that longer Ramadan fasting has a
negative effect on output growth in Muslim countries, but increases the subjective well-
being of Muslims. The current evidence suggests that the economic impact needs to be
better understood in light of prosocial implications.
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